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This research hypothesizes that, in markets where information costs, transac-
tion costs and the economic impact of information can vary widely, we should
expect predictability to vary systematically. We test this hypothesis with data on
equity real estate investment trusts (REITs) from 1985 to 1992. We document
that levels of predictability vary with firm characteristics like leverage, size and
focus. Momentum is stronger for larger, more levered REITs. Reversion is faster
for focused, levered REITs. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that,
in equilibrium, securities, where information is either less costly to acquire or
has less impact on fundamental value, should exhibit less predictability.
Is there an equilibrium level of predictability in asset markets? Numerous stud-
ies in real estate, equity and currency markets have documented significant
momentum and reversion in these asset markets that vary over time and space
and with the characteristics of the asset. Is this variation in predictability system-
atic? In this research we hypothesize that, in markets where information costs,
transaction costs and the economic impact of information can vary widely, we
should expect predictability to vary systematically. We test this hypothesis with
data on equity real estate investment trusts (REITs) from 1985 to 1992 that in-
clude net asset values, a metric for fundamental value. We document that levels
of predictability vary with firm characteristics like leverage, size and focus that
proxy for information costs, transaction costs and economic impact. The data
also allow us to compare the level of predictability in the relatively liquid equity
markets to that of the less liquid property markets and to confirm that the more
liquid market exhibits less predictability.
It has long been accepted that financial markets, in particular equity markets,
are at least weak-form efficient so that excess returns cannot be earned by using
investment strategies based on historical share prices or other public finan-
cial data. Efficiency, however, does not rule out predictability if information
is costly to obtain. Theorists have modeled situations where predictability is
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consistent with rational expectations equilibrium or Bayesian Nash equilibrium
(Brunnermeier 2001).1
Although information is a zero-marginal-cost good once produced, there are
incentives to hide rather than share information for strategic reasons until po-
sitions have been secured in financial markets. The estimates that information
traders use for the fundamental values of traded assets are not costlessly re-
vealed in public data; but rather they must be produced at a cost by firms that
specialize in collecting and analyzing the necessary information. These infor-
mation producers may then trade profitably for their own accounts or sell the
information to specialized trading firms like hedge funds. In equilibrium with
free entry we should expect that the marginal producer/trader will break even
but intra-marginal low-cost producers will continue to earn abnormal returns.
For example, an article on hedge funds in the Wall Street Journal provides
evidence on the effects of equilibrating entry and exit from this industry:
Fat returns are becoming more elusive. In 2005, the average hedge fund
returned 9.3%, below the 11.4% average for the past decade, according to
Hedge Fund Research Inc., a Chicago consultant. By comparison, the S&P
500 index returned 7.7% last year. A record 848 hedge funds closed up shop
in 2005, many of them hobbled by poor performance, according to Hedge
Fund Research (Pulliam 2006).
Earlier research (Capozza, Hendershott and Mack 2004, CHM henceforth) on
housing markets documented that housing prices have high degrees of both se-
rial correlation and mean reversion, that the levels of correlation and reversion
vary among metro areas and that the variation is at least in part attributable to the
level of real income, population growth and construction costs. In frictionless
markets predictable components of prices like correlation and reversion can be
arbitraged and eliminated. While there may not be any completely frictionless
markets, there are varying degrees of frictions like information costs and trans-
action costs among asset markets. Real estate markets are generally viewed as
high-friction markets and equity markets as low friction.
Real estate properties are unique in trading both in illiquid property markets, on
Main Street and in securitized portfolios of properties as real estate investment
1 At least four situations can produce predictability in models that are consistent with the
equilibrium: (1) asymmetric information and slow diffusion of the information (Hong
and Stein 1999), (2) strategic behavior (Kyle 1985), (3) inventory effects arising from
regular patterns of demand, HS henceforth (e.g., payday effects) and (4) liquidity and
margin interactions: Brunnermeier (2006) outlines how volatility shocks can result in
margin increases that eventually mean revert.
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trusts (REITs) on Wall Street, where liquidity can be enhanced relative to the
underlying properties (Benveniste, Capozza and Seguin 2000). This duality en-
ables natural laboratory experiments where we are able to control for numerous
confounding factors by focusing on the behavior of the same or highly similar
assets in two different markets.
Our research exploits this duality by applying the CHM (2004) framework for
price dynamics to securitized real estate in REITs. We are able to compare
both the degree of predictability and the determinants of predictability in these
two markets. Our empirical tests focus on the interaction among the serial
correlation and mean reversion coefficients and economic forces.
CHM (2004) translate standard empirical formulations for estimating serial
correlation and mean reversion into a corresponding second-order difference
equation. The properties of the difference equation determine the required pa-
rameter values that produce the four major dynamic structures: damped versus
cyclical and convergent versus divergent or explosive. By first defining the
mathematical structure implied by the empirical estimates, they are able to give
rigorous definition to terms like “overreaction,” “underreaction” and “bubble.”
Overreaction occurs when the correlation and reversion coefficient pairs as-
sume values in the oscillatory region where the roots of the characteristic or
complementary function of the difference equation are complex. Mathemati-
cally, a coefficient pair that lies in the divergent or explosive region is one way
to define a bubble. This divergent behavior arises when the serial correlation
exceeds one.
In this research we estimate the relevant correlation and reversion parameters
using a unique panel data set for 75 equity REITs from 1985 to 1992. An
important variable in the data set is the net asset value (NAV) of each REIT for
each year. The NAVs are carefully constructed from the values of the properties
held by each REIT using the procedure documented in Capozza and Lee (1995,
1996, CL henceforth). For each REIT property, the location and property type
(e.g., office, retail, industrial or apartment) is identified and used to obtain an
estimate of the current market value of the underlying properties. These values
are then substituted for Generally Accepted Accounting Principles-depreciated
property assets on a REIT’s balance sheet to obtain the NAVs.
In studies of mean reversion one must ask what the values are that the assets
revert toward. In most cases2 reversion is simply defined as price reversal at
some horizon. A more meaningful economic basis for reversion is reversion to a
2 For example, see De Bondt and Thaler (1985), Jegadeesh (1990), Jegadeesh and Titman
(1995) and Lo and MacKinlay (1990).
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suitably defined fundamental value. If fundamental values can be obtained, more
powerful tests of reversion become possible. Reversion can then be observed
not only when prices reverse direction but any time prices converge to the
fundamental value. By contrast, using price reversals to define reversion is
fraught with both type I and type II errors, which are mitigated by having a
metric for fundamental value. For example, if fundamentals improve at the
same time that a stock is reverting down, we will not see a price reversal if the
improving fundamentals exceed the reversion. In this study, we use the NAVs
as our metric for fundamental value.
In the absence of conditioning on fundamental value, estimates of momentum
will be biased because a relevant variable is being excluded. For example,
consider an asset whose price and value are initially $20. If the fundamental
value increases to $30 and the price does not adjust fully and immediately to
this new level, the price must revert toward $30 over time. This reversion to the
new fundamental value will be misidentified as serial correlation if fundamental
value and a reversion parameter are not included in the estimates.
The analytical framework of CHM (2004) is closely related to the story and
analysis in HS (1999). In HS (1999) two types of boundedly rational traders
interact in financial markets: “newswatchers,” or information traders, and “mo-
mentum” traders. Information traders trade on new information. If information
diffuses slowly to the risk-averse information traders, equity prices underreact
to new information and revert slowly and predictably to the new fundamental
values. The underreaction implies that momentum traders can profit by trend
chasing because they are able to analyze price movements and infer future price
movements from the price patterns caused by the slow diffusion of information.
The presence of momentum traders whose forecasts are simple functions of past
prices accelerates prices in the direction of fundamentals, “but this comes at
the expense of creating an eventual overreaction to any news” (HS 1999). No-
tice that the actions of momentum traders directly impact the momentum or
autocorrelation whereas those of the information traders determine the speed
of reversion.
Our contributions are first to provide a direct comparison of predictability in
the liquid and illiquid incarnations of real estate assets. Second, we provide
additional evidence on serial correlation and mean reversion in equity mar-
kets using a unique panel data set with direct metrics for fundamental value
that are normally not available and that enable more powerful statistical tests
than in previous research. Third, and most importantly, we model and estimate
equations relating the extent of serial correlation and mean reversion to pos-
sible determinants such as information costs, transaction costs and valuation
precision.
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In the next section we review the CHM framework and the difference equation
that characterizes the dynamic properties. The third section describes the panel
data set we use for our estimates, and the fourth section discusses the empirical
results. The fitted values for the coefficients indicate the wide variation in
possible dynamics. The final section summarizes and concludes.
Dynamics in the CHM Model
The concept of mean reversion is the basic notion that, in the long run, markets
converge toward equilibrium. In financial markets, long-run equilibrium implies
that there are no arbitrage opportunities within the limits of transaction costs.
An important characteristic of REITs is that if the shares are selling for less
than the value of the underlying properties then a REIT can sell properties and
distribute the cash to shareholders. In the converse case, a REIT can issue stock
and buy more properties, thereby causing convergence of stock prices and the
underlying properties. That is, the NAV we will use as a proxy for fundamental
value is directly arbitragable, albeit at a substantial cost.3
In each time period, t, and for each REIT, we assume there is a long-run equilib-
rium value for the stock price that is determined by the value of the underlying
property assets and other variables:
P∗t = p(Vt , Xt ), (1)
where P∗ is the equilibrium or fundamental value per share for the REIT, Vt
is the NAV per share as defined above and Xt is a vector of other explanatory
variables that influence the fundamental value.
Value changes in CHM (2004) are governed by reversion to the fundamental
value and by serial correlation according to
Pt = αPt−1 + β
(
P∗t−1 − Pt−1
) + γP∗t , (2)
where  is the difference operator. If we define Pt to be the stock price at time t,
then Equation (2) represents a dollar return formulation. Alternatively, we can
define Pi to be the log of the dividend-adjusted stock price to obtain the more
3 An interesting question to ask is whether arbitrage will cause REIT equity prices to
converge to the NAVs implied by Main Street property prices or the Main Street property
prices to converge to the implied cap rates in the equity markets. Because the commercial
real estate market is very large (worth trillions of dollars) relative to the amount of real
estate securitized into REITs (less than $10 billion of REIT equity in the sample time
period), we expect that most of the impact of any arbitrage activity will be on REIT
equity prices rather than on the underlying properties. Even today after 20-fold growth
of REIT equity, REITs remain a small percentage of the overall commercial property
markets.
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common percentage return formulation. The first term on the right in Equation
(2) is the serial correlation, or momentum term, where α is the serial correlation
coefficient. The second term is an error correction or reversion term that provides
reversion to the equilibrium value. β (0 < β < 1) is the rate of reversion or
adjustment to the equilibrium. The third term captures the contemporaneous
adjustment to fundamentals. Partial adjustment implies that 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.
Equation (2) can be rewritten in difference equation form by substituting Pt −
Pt−1 for Pt.
Pt − (1 + α − β)Pt−1 + αPt−2 = γ P∗t + (β − γ )P∗t−1. (3)
The solution is described by the pair of roots, B1, B2, given by
B1, B2 = (1 + α − β) ±
√
(1 + α − β)2 − 4α
2
, (4)
which arise from rewriting and solving the left-hand-side quadratic,
p2 − (1 + α − β)p + α = 0.
Oscillations
When the roots are complex, that is, when
(1 + α − β)2 < 4α, (5)
oscillations or cycles will occur. Therefore, in (α, β) parameter space, when
the (α, β) pairs satisfy Equation (7), prices will exhibit oscillatory behavior
(overshooting). Otherwise, price changes will be damped (no overshooting).
Stability of equilibrium requires that the moduli of the roots, B1, B2, both be
less than one. See CHM (2004) for more detail. With the restrictions from the
economics of the problem, a necessary condition for convergence to equilibrium
is that the absolute value of serial correlation, α, is less than one.
|α| < 1. (6)
Conditions (5) and (6) divide the parameter space into four regions. Figure 1
summarizes the analysis graphically in (α, β) parameter space. In the figure,
the curve defined by Equation (5) separates cases without oscillations below
the curve from parameter pairs with fluctuations above the curve.
The vertical line at α = 1 divides the parameter space into a divergent or
explosive region to the right of the line and a convergent region to the left.
When the autocorrelation coefficient is above unity, deviations from steady
state are magnified over time and the path of values diverges from the long-run
equilibrium.
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This graph illustrates the parameter values that generate the various dynamic patterns
when equilibrium is shocked. Values of the autocorrelation coefficient greater than 1
result in divergent or explosive behavior. Parameter values that lie above the curved line
result in oscillations or cycles (overshooting).
The two curves divide Figure 1 into four regions. Figure 2 summarizes the
types of dynamic behavior that arise in each of the four regions in response to a
ramp change in P∗. A subcase of region one occurs when serial correlation, α,
is negative. In this subcase, price converges without oscillations but in a two-
period sawtooth-alternating pattern caused by the negative autocorrelation.
The Data
The database, introduced and described in detail in CL (1995, 1996) and sub-
sequently used in Bradley, Capozza and Seguin (1998), Benveniste, Capozza
and Seguin (2001) and Capozza and Seguin (1998, 1999, 2000, 2001a, 2001b),
contains a subset of the REITs listed in NAREIT (National Association of Real
Estate Investment Trusts) source books from 1985 to 1992.4 The database con-
tains balance sheet and income statement information on 75 exchange-traded
4 Many REIT observers conjecture that the newer REITs that went public after 1991 are
different from the earlier generation of REITs in our sample. Recently the possibility of
a regime shift for REITs has been tested over the 1971 to 2004 period by Kim, Leatham
and Bessler (2006), who find that there is a statistically significant break point in the
dynamics of REITs but that it is in 1980 not in 1992. Thus the statistical evidence suggests
that our sample is likely to be representative of REIT behavior from 1980 forward.
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equity REITs. Retail, office, industrial and apartment REITs, where data on the
underlying properties is available, are included. Mortgage, hotel, restaurant and
health care REITs are excluded. Additional financial data for each of the 298
usable annual observations were manually extracted from 10-K reports, annual
reports and proxy statements.
A unique feature of the CL (1995, 1996) database is estimates of the NAVs of
the properties held. To create the NAVs, CL assigned location- and property-
type–specific capitalization rates to each property and then calculated a REIT’s
aggregate capitalization rate as the weighted average of the real estate asset
portfolio capitalization rates. Property assets were then calculated by dividing
the REIT’s total property cash flow by the weighted capitalization rate. Finally,
NAVs were calculated by subtracting liabilities from estimated property assets
plus other assets. Additional adjustments were made for joint ventures, dif-
ferences between coupon rates and market yields on debt and also property
turnover.5
It is important to note that the property-specific capitalization rates and hence
property values are estimated using actual transaction data from the commer-
cial property market. Thus, these values provide a meaningful anchor for a
REIT’s strategy when stock prices deviate from the underlying value of the
properties. As indicated above, a REIT can sell (buy) stock and buy (sell)
properties when stock prices deviate by more than a transaction-cost boundary
from the NAVs. Thus we view NAVs as an excellent proxy for fundamental
value.
It should also be noted that, because the CL procedure uses cap rates that are
specific to the property type and to the location (metro area), these estimates of
NAV control for much of the risk and growth opportunities associated with the
assets underlying the REITs. The corporate-level growth opportunities, which
are reflected in the stock prices, will arise primarily (but not solely) from the
growth opportunities in the properties. Thus, when comparing stock prices to
NAVs, most growth opportunities have been included in both the equity and
property valuations.
5 The NAV estimates are not simple capitalizations of funds from operations conditional
on an arbitrary capitalization rate, as is often and easily done by practitioners. Instead,
the NAV estimates are carefully aggregated from prices, rents and capitalization rates
specific to the property types and locations of the properties held by each REIT. To
date, no one has duplicated or extended the data sample with data of similar academic
quality.
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Table 1  Summary statistics.
Standard





116.3 143.9 4.1 1,070.8
Net Asset Value (Main
Street Value of Equity)
($ Mil.)
110.3 107.5 5.9 642.1
Tobin’s q ratio 1.00 0.37 .10 2.86
Dollar Volume ($ Mil.) 131.3 152.8 1.3 925.1
Leverage Ratio (%) 35.8 23.7 0.3 90.0
Property Type
Herfindahl (%)
66.8 24.1 26.0 1.00
Percentage Held by
Insiders
7.3 10.0 0.0 42.0
This table reports means, standard deviations and extreme values for a number of
summary statistics calculated across our sample of 298 observations for 75 firms. Wall
Street Value of equity is the market capitalization (size) of equity. Main Street Value of
Equity is the real estate market value of assets as defined by Capozza and Lee (1995)
minus the book value of liabilities. Tobin’s q ratio is the ratio of market equity (stock
price times number of shares) to the market value of properties plus the book value
of other assets minus book liabilities. Turnover is the annual dollar volume divided
by the market capitalization. The leverage ratio is defined as total liabilities/(total
liabilities + market value of the equity). The Herfindahl concentration measure is the
sum of squared fractions of asset portfolios by property type and geographic regions,
respectively.
Summary statistics for these Main Street–determined fundamental values and
for Wall Street–determined market capitalization values are presented in the first
two rows of Table 1. Both Wall Street and Main Street equity values average
just over $100 million and vary from essentially zero to $1 billion ($650 million
for Main Street replacement values).
In the empirical analysis that follows we will explore the interaction between the
parameters of the difference equation and a variety of metrics for information
costs, transaction costs and valuation precision. To control for the effects of
relative liquidity, we follow the lead of both finance and real estate literatures
and employ annual dollar trading value.6 Dollar volume varies from $1 million
6 See Peterson and Fialkowski (1994), in finance and Bhasin, Cole and Kiely (1997),
Benveniste, Capozza and Seguin (2001) and Clayton and MacKinnon (2000) in real
estate.
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to just under $1 billion, with a mean of around $130 million. The variation is
also dramatic when expressed as a multiple of equity: the range is one-eighth
through five-and-a-half.
We include a measure of the focus of the asset base: the Herfindahl index based







where St is the proportion of a firm’s assets invested in each of four real estate
types: office, warehouse, retail or apartment. This metric varies across almost
their entire range.
The CL (1995, 1996) database contains measures of regulatory-defined insider
ownership gleaned from the Spectrum database. The underlying source of such
data is the collection of 13-D quarterly filings that insiders and institutions must
file quarterly with the SEC.7 Holdings by insiders vary from 0% to 42% with a
mean of 7%.
The Initial Estimates of the Base Model
Comparison of REITs to the CHM Housing Estimates8
We begin by comparing the results from estimating Equation (2) for REITs with
the estimates in CHM (2004) for housing.9 With lower frictions in the equity
markets we expect less predictability for REIT prices. The results are displayed
in Table 2, Models 1–4. The first model displays the housing market estimates
from CHM (2004). The second model uses actual REIT annual returns as the
dependent variable, while the third and fourth use Roll (1984) returns that skip
one month in the return calculation to mitigate the negative serial correlation
induced by bid/ask bounce. Model 4 uses firm-level fixed effects as well as time
fixed effects.10
7 See CL (1995) for details.
8 In this research we use “predictability” in the traditional sense where future returns
are not completely independent of the information set available today and focus on the
size of the momentum and reversion coefficients. An alternative approach (e.g., Durnev
et al. 2003) focuses on the fit of a market model and argues that a low R2 signals more
information-laden stock prices.
9 It can be argued that a more relevant comparison would be between REITs and com-
mercial property rather than residential property. However, similar results for commer-
cial property are not available as yet. Residential property is the closest available proxy
for commercial real estate. Relative to residential real estate, commercial real estate is
characterized by larger transaction sizes and much less liquidity. Therefore, at least in
these dimensions, we should anticipate even starker comparisons for commercial real
estate.
10 Many argue that REITs are more than a collection of properties and that specific
managers and structures can add or detract from the value of the firm. REITs tended
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Both the correlation and reversion estimates, α and β, are typically smaller
in the REIT sample than in the corresponding housing sample, that is, there
is less predictability in the equity-REIT market than in the housing market as
expected. α, in particular, is not statistically significant in Model 2, the percent
return version, and is about one third the size of the corresponding housing
coefficient. Using Roll returns in Model 3 reduces the effects of bid/ask bounce
(see below) and doubles the α estimate to a significant level. Adding firm-level
fixed effect in Model 4, however, returns the α estimate to an insignificant level.
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that REIT equity markets are
subject to smaller transaction and information costs than housing markets.
The β estimates for REITS are significant in all versions and similar in mag-
nitude to those for housing. These results are consistent with slow diffusion of
information in both the housing and REIT equity markets.
The coefficient for the contemporaneous change in fundamental value, γ , is
similar in magnitude across the markets and is always highly significant. A
significant γ , however, does not imply predictability unless contemporaneous
changes in fundamentals are predictable.
Because the return data in Model 1 are based on yearly averages of price data,
the α for housing is biased upward (Working 1960). On the other hand, the α
for REITs is biased downward from the effects of bid-ask bounce (Roll 1986).
To address this later bias we follow the standard practice of deleting a month
from the data so that yearly returns are calculated from the end of January to
the end of December instead of from end of December to end of December. The
results appear as Models 3 and 4 in Table 2. The coefficient for α is significant
and positive in Model 3 with only time fixed effects but becomes insignificant
in Model 4 when individual fixed effects are included.
To summarize this section, we find strong evidence that REITs adjust to fun-
damentals contemporaneously. About 35–40% of this effect occurs in the year
of the change in fundamentals. Additional reversion toward fundamental value
occurs in future years at a rate of 11–27% per year. Despite this predictable
pattern of reversion, there is little evidence of continuance arising from trend
following momentum traders in the final Model 4 with both time and individual
fixed effects for this sample of REITs. This latter result contrasts with the evi-
dence in Chui, Titman and Wei (2003, CTW henceforth) who do find significant
to be more passive in their investment strategies during our sample period than today.
Nevertheless, we include firm-level fixed effects to address the concern that some REITs
that add value to their properties might not converge to the strict calculated NAV.
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momentum in the pre-1990 period. The CTW (2003) sample, however, does
not include a metric for fundamental value and uses a shorter holding period.
Arguably, REITs were an unattractive sector for momentum traders during this
time period. REITs were small, weakly followed by analysts and thinly traded
during this sample period. All these factors might make REITs unlikely targets
for momentum traders.
In the next section we explore whether the degree of momentum and reversion11
is influenced by metrics for information costs, transaction costs and valuation
precision.
The Determinants of Equilibrium Correlation and Reversion
Our goal in this section is to explore the causes of differences in the dynamic
response of REIT equity prices to shocks. In the context of the model, these















where i indexes the variables, k indexes REITs, the Yi, which may include a
subset of the X and a unit vector, are independent variables and Ȳi represents
the mean value of Yi in the sample.12
An important issue is the choice of the Yi, which affects the predictability coef-
ficients α and β. Many stories, both behavioral13 and rational14 are consistent
with predictability. For example, all the estimates of γ in Table 2 are much less
11 It is worth noting that we have not assumed that one market is correct and the other
wrong. Prices in both markets will interact to achieve efficient prices in both markets.
However, because the private commercial real estate market is so much bigger (close
to $1 trillion) than the public equity market (less than $10 billion) during the sample
period, we should expect any arbitrage between the two to impact the smaller equity
market more than the larger private market.
12 In Equation (2
′
) we have assumed that γ is not endogenous. Allowing for endogeneity
affects the amplitude but not the frequency (CHM 2004).
13 See Odean (1998), Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer and
Subrahmanyam (1998) and Barberis and Huang (2001).
14 See Conrad and Kaul (1998), Berk, Green and Naik (1999) and Johnson (2002).
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than one. This means that less than the full change in fundamentals is incorpo-
rated into the prices contemporaneously. If investors underreact to changes in
fundamentals in one period, then prices must mean revert toward fundamental
value in the future if equilibrium is ever to be attained. A behavioral expla-
nation would emphasize psychological studies that document underreaction or
overreaction to new information.15 Rational approaches, on the other hand,
might focus on costly information that diffuses slowly (Heaton and Brav 2002,
HS 1999).
Econometrically, if we believe Equation (2) is the correct model, then exclusion
of one of the variables will bias the remaining coefficients, that is, the standard
bias arising from exclusion of a relevant variable. For example, suppose only
lagged price changes are included and mean reversion is excluded. If mean
reversion is partial in each time period, that is, if β is less than one, then
successive price change realizations will tend to have the same sign as prices
revert to fundamental value. The estimated statistical serial correlation, then,
will be biased upward. Thus the serial correlation, or α, as defined in Equation
(2), is not identical to momentum as typically defined in the finance literature.
Because metrics for a fundamental value are generally not available in studies
of price predictability in financial markets, most estimates of momentum are
biased upward.
Among the research on equity markets, the most closely related model to our
Equation (2) is the work by HS (1999). In the HS world there are two types
of boundedly rational stock traders, information traders, or newswatchers, and
price traders. Information traders follow information events and conditionally
reassess their estimate of the value of the equity based on the new information.
Information, especially nonpublic information, is not impounded immediately
into prices but diffuses slowly to the information traders. Information traders
might include insiders who would clearly have access to accurate and timely
information and value investors who have a comparative advantage at process-
ing the new information. As the information diffuses, the stock price will tend
to move in one direction over a period of time.
Price traders, on the other hand, follow the stock price movements but not
the news. When they observe one-sided movements, that is, trends or momen-
tum, they piggyback on the information traders and make trades that reinforce
the trend. If returns are correlated, then price traders (technicians/momentum
traders) can use price history to trade profitably provided they identify the trends
early enough.
15 See Bern (1965) and Tversky and Kahneman (1974).
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In Equation (2) or (2
′
), implicitly, the α arises from the actions of the price
traders, while the β emerges from the optimization of the information traders.
Although both types of traders are constrained to specific types of information,
they are nevertheless rational optimizers within the bounds of the constraints.
We expect the following stylized facts to apply:
 Impact—Companies where the information event will have more im-
pact will be preferred. For example, macroeconomic or industry events
will be magnified for highly levered firms, making them more efficient
trading vehicles.
 Precision—Companies and events with more precise information
(higher signal-to-noise ratios) will be the preferred trading vehicles.
Price traders should be more active in securities that have stronger
trends relative to their volatility. Information traders should be more
active among companies where financials are more transparent, thus
making it easier to assess the impact of any new information.
 Costs—Because revenue from trading must more than cover transaction
costs, securities with lower transaction costs will be preferred.
Economic Impact
Any given unit of information will have more impact on asset prices when the
security is leveraged to the information. For REITs, both operating and financial
leverage will affect economic impact. However, we expect financial leverage
to be the more important because financial leverage varies widely (see Table 1)
whereas operating leverage should be similar among firms in the same industry.
Information and Transaction Costs
Most of the research on predictability has focused on the role of information
and transaction costs. First, consider the role of information dissemination.
Real estate markets are a natural place to argue that relevant information will
diffuse slowly. In real estate markets information costs are high, transactions
are infrequent and the product is highly heterogeneous. As a result, participants
have difficulty assessing the current value of properties and may have to use
sales distant in time or location for setting reservation prices (Quan and Quigley
1991). Markets with a higher number of transactions have lower information
costs; thus, prices should adjust more quickly to their long-run equilibrium
value, that is, mean reversion should be greater. Clapp, Dolde and Tirtiroglu
(1995) argue that information costs will be lower the greater the number of
transactions per unit area.
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In contrast to the underlying properties, real estate stocks are traded frequently,
which should improve the flow of information. On the other hand, REITs are
portfolios of the underlying properties, which obscure the property-level infor-
mation Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) test the implication of HS (1999) that stocks
for which information travels slowly have more momentum. They find that the
profitability of momentum strategies declines with firm size after a point and
with analyst coverage. Furthermore, the analyst coverage effect is stronger for
stocks that are past losers than for stocks that are past winners. For REITs we
find that momentum increases with firm size, but it should be recognized that
all REITs in the sample are small caps with the largest still only $1 billion in
size.
Another measure that may capture speed of information dissemination is the
degree of insider ownership. On the one hand, pricing errors in stocks largely
held and frequently traded by insiders are likely to be small. Any mispric-
ing is likely to be corrected quickly. On the other hand, the speed of mean
reversion may be lessened if insiders are restricted from trading on their in-
formation. For example, Huddart, Ke and Shi (2006) find that insiders refrain
from executing profitable trades before quarterly earnings announcements and
sell (buy) after unexpectedly high (low) earnings are announced. In our sam-
ple, inside ownership has an inconsistent effect on momentum that varies with
specification.
CTW (2003) test the slow information diffusion hypothesis of HS against the
investor overconfidence hypothesis of Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam
(1998) in the REIT market. They divide their sample into two periods: pre- and
post-1990. They only find momentum and reversal in the post-1990 period and
argue that this supports the overconfidence theory because information diffusion
in the second period was higher than in the first. However, Hung and Glascock
(2005) attribute the higher momentum portfolio returns in the latter period to a
1992 change in legislation on REITs that resulted in higher dividend/price ratios.
Johnson (2002) showed that momentum portfolios differ in dividend growth
rates. Our data are focused on the early period only, where we do find evidence
of both reversion and momentum. Our interpretation of the results is quite
different.
The existence of transaction costs may prevent prices from reverting if the costs
are large enough relative to the mispricing. Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004)
show that stocks that generate persistent momentum returns are also those with
high transaction costs. This result can arise when metrics for fundamental value
are not available and are excluded. The measured momentum may actually be
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a reversion to new fundamentals as described above. High transaction costs can
slow adjustment and may increase persistence.
Lee and Swaminathan (2000) form 30 portfolios based on past returns and vol-
ume using data from all firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange and the
American Stock Exchange from 1965 to 1995. They find that eventually the
momentum effect reported by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) reverses. Further-
more, this reversal is predictable using past volume data. In their sample, the
prices of high (low) volume stocks that have performed well (poorly) tend to
mean revert more quickly (slowly). Inasmuch as volume is a proxy for transac-
tion costs, this is consistent with HS (1999). By contrast, we are unable to find
any affect for dollar volume, the proxy for transaction costs in our sample.
Valuation Precision
Because we are interested in momentum and mean reversion with respect to
the fundamental value, variables related to the ease of valuation are of interest.
Mispricing is likely to be more significant in complex firms that are difficult to
evaluate than in more focused firms. We use a Herfindahl index as a measure
of focus.
The NAV of more highly leveraged firms may be less precisely measured even
if debt is easier to value than equity. For example, consider the case where the
value of liabilities is known but the assets are measured imprecisely. In this
situation, the uncertainty about the fundamental or NAV of the equity will be
magnified in percentage terms for more levered firms.
In addition, highly levered firms face possible bankruptcy costs that are difficult
to measure (Andrade and Kaplan 1998). As debt increases, bankruptcy becomes
more likely. Additionally, market values of debt are also difficult to estimate.
On the other hand, if firms have to go to the debt market often, more information
may actually be available about the firm and mean reversion may occur more
quickly.
To summarize this section, in asset markets efficiency arises from the actions
and trading of rational information gatherers. The interaction of boundedly
rational traders can result in predictable momentum and reversion in prices.
Mean reversion to fundamental value proceeds slowly as information about
fundamentals is disseminated to information traders. Momentum in prices arises
when price traders, who process only past price movements, identify that prices
are trending to a new fundamental value.
These two types of traders are both information producers who evaluate the price
impact, the precision and the associated transaction costs before trading on their
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information. High-impact, low-cost information events and firms should attract
more information producers and result in faster convergence to equilibrium.
The price path, however, may be characterized by overshooting when price
traders add sufficient momentum to the dynamics.
In equilibrium, with free entry of information producers, the marginal producer
will break even; but intra-marginal (low-cost) producers may earn abnormal
returns. More lucrative events and/or securities will attract more information
producers who can precipitate faster price adjustments.
Empirical Estimates
A number of variables are available in the data set that relate to the production
of information.
 Log of Size (i.e., market capitalization)—Larger firms tend to be more
actively traded and more widely followed by analysts. With better in-
formation and lower transaction costs, larger firms should attract more
information producers. Adjustment to new information should evolve
at a faster pace.
 Log of Dollar volume—As with size, more actively traded firms, that
is, more liquid firms, will have lower effective trading costs.
 Debt to Asset Ratio—The ratio of debt to assets measures the degree
of financial leverage for the REIT. We expect that information will
have more impact on more highly levered firms. Thus, leverage should
attract more information producers. Adjustment speeds should be faster
for more levered firms.
 Inside Ownership—Insider ownership, as indicated above, can have
offsetting impacts. We expect inside owners to have better information
but at the same time regulations constrain their trading.
 Herfindahl Focus Index—The focus index measures the extent to which
a REIT holds multiple property types (apartment, office, retail and
industrial). More focused REITs are easier for investors to evaluate
(Capozza and Seguin 1999). Transparency should attract information
producers and speed convergence.
Endogenous Dynamic Adjustment
Estimates for Equation (2
′
) are presented in Table 3. To control for the effects
of market fluctuations, year fixed effects are included in all estimated models.
In addition, to control for any omitted characteristics of the firms, individual
fixed effects are included in Models 3 and 4 of Table 3. Included in each model
are the lagged return, the lagged deviation from fundamental value and the
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contemporaneous change in fundamental value. In addition, the mean devia-
tion of the five variables above is interacted with the lagged return and the
lagged deviation from fundamentals in Models 1–4 of Table 3. The significant
coefficients are in boldface.
In the second and fourth model only the most significant interaction terms are
included in the regression. To simplify the discussion we concentrate on Model
4 in Table 3. The other models can be viewed as robustness tests. As such we do
note that there is some variation in the results depending on the specification.
However, there is reliable sign consistency among significant coefficients.
Momentum—The momentum coefficient in Model 4 is 7%, which means that
this year’s price change is 7% of last year’s. However, the coefficient is not
significant. Among the variables interacted with the lagged return, Size, Debt
to Assets and Property Focus have positive effects on momentum. Size and
Property Focus are significant. The coefficient on size implies that doubling
the size of a REIT relative to the average REIT increases the momentum (i.e.,
autocorrelation) by 0.2. Price traders have a strong preference for larger REITs.
It should be recognized that even the largest REIT in this time period was still
quite small with a market capitalization under $1 billion.
Price traders are also attracted to focused and levered firms in this sample, con-
sistent with the hypothesis that information producers enter when information is
more precise and has more impact. The coefficient on Debt to Assets, however,
is not significant in Model 4, although it is in Models 1 and 2.
Mean Reversion—In Model 4 the speed of reversion is 26% per year, that is,
26% of the difference between fundamental value and stock price is removed
each year. Among the variables interacted with the lagged deviation from NAV,
Debt to Assets and Property Focus both have positive effects on the speed of
reversion, although Property Focus is not always significant. The higher im-
pact of information for firms with high debt-to-asset ratios attracts information
trading as well as price trading. The coefficient on Debt to Assets implies that
a fully levered firm (Debt to Assets of 1) will mean revert at nearly three times
the rate of an unlevered firm.
How Do the Estimates Relate to the Dynamics Defined
by the Difference Equations?
The implication of Model 4 in Table 3 is that for each time period and for each
REIT the dynamics will vary depending on the realizations of the exogenous
variables. What do the fitted values for the usable observations tell us about the
possible dynamics?
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This figure superimposes the fitted values (Table 3, Model 4) for the serial correlation
and mean reversion parameters for each of the REIT observations onto the parameter
space plot (Figure 1). The mean values for correlation and reversion, 0.07 and 0.26,
respectively, lie solidly inside Region I, the convergent, not the oscillation region. How-
ever, the fitted values span both the cycle (Region III, convergent oscillations) and no
cycle (Region I, convergent no oscillation) regions. Unlike the housing market estimates
in CHM (2004), none of the observations have correlations exceeding one, which would
put them in the divergent (or bubble) range.
Figure 3 summarizes the results. The figure plots the autocorrelation and mean
reversion coefficients for each REIT in each year and is superimposed on Fig-
ure 1. Several items are worth noting. First, the realizations are spread over two
of the four regions defined earlier and encompass both damped and oscillatory
behavior, that is, both underreaction and overreaction.
Second, 71% of the realizations lie in the damped noncyclical region (I) (see
Table 4). Therefore, we can expect damped noncyclical dynamics (underreac-
tion) to be the most common reaction to price shocks. Another 29% fall into
Region III, the convergent oscillation or overreaction region. There are no real-
izations with an α greater than one, which is necessary for divergent or bubble
dynamics.
The typical dynamic pattern when the parameters are set to their average fitted
values from Table 3, Model 4 (α = 0.07, β = 0.26, γ = 0.35) is depicted in
Figure 4. The pattern is convergent and nonoscillatory. Prices rise substantially
in the year of the shock and then slowly converge to the new fundamental value.
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Table 4  Distribution of fitted parameters for correlation and reversion.
Region Percent
Region I, Convergent, No Oscillation 71
Subregion IA, Convergent Alternation 45
Region II, Divergent, No Oscillation 0
Region III, Convergent Oscillation 29
Region IV, Divergent Oscillation 0
Total 100
This table lists the percentage of fitted observations in each of the regions defined in
Figure 1.
Figure 4  Dynamic behavior at the sample means.










This figure illustrates the dynamic behavior for values of the parameters at the sample
estimates in Table 3, Model 4. The pattern is convergent without oscillations at these
estimates. Prices converge to the new equilibrium after the shock to the equilibrium
value, P∗, at time 1. The parameter values used to generate the graph are α = 0.07, β =
0.26 and γ = 0.35.
To illustrate the range of dynamics arising from the estimates, Figure 5 plots
the time series patterns arising when the correlation and reversion parameters
are large, based on the realizations from Model 4 in Table 3 (α = 0.73, β =
0.54, γ = 0.35). With these values, the time series pattern is still convergent
but with persistent oscillations.
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Figure 5  Dynamic behavior for large α and β.
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This figure illustrates the dynamic behavior for large realizations of the parameters in
Table 3, Model 4. The parameters values are α = 0.73, β = 0.54 and γ = 0.35. The
graph illustrates the range of dynamics encompassed by the estimates.
Conclusion
In a world where information is costly to acquire, the structure of the investment
industry that supplies and trades on the information can have an impact on the
predictability of security prices. Our stylized investment industry is one where
fundamental value changes exogenously. The investment industry produces
information about the changing fundamental values and trades toward efficient
prices. Information is produced using scarce resources, including labor or talent
and capital. With fixed costs and free entry into the industry, equilibrium arises
when entry of new firms reduces the profits of the marginal firm to normal but
intra-marginal producers may still earn abnormal profits.
The interaction of boundedly rational information and momentum traders re-
sults in both momentum and mean reversion. Empirically, estimates of reversion
require a metric for fundamental value, which is typically not available. In the
absence of a metric for reversion, we have argued that estimates of momentum
are biased upward. Metrics for fundamental value are available for REITs, the
laboratory for our empirical estimates.
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In this stylized world:
 The value of information is the net payoff from trading on the informa-
tion;
 Information is less costly to acquire for some securities, especially large
firms and widely followed firms;
 Net revenue from information is higher for more levered firms and more
liquid firms;
 Private information is more valuable than public information so that
corporate insiders have an information advantage;
 Barriers to entry increase the value of information, for example, for
market makers and specialists.
We exploit the power of the CL (1995, 1996) REIT data, which includes es-
timates of net asset values for 75 REITs calculated from the value of the un-
derlying properties. We use the net asset values as a metric for fundamental
value because arbitrage is possible between properties and REITs. Following
the framework in CHM (2004) we estimate the momentum and reversion pa-
rameters for REITs and compare them to earlier estimates for the housing mar-
kets. Like the housing market estimates, REITs also exhibit significant mean
reversion. However, unlike the housing estimates, there is little evidence of
momentum during the sample period. We note that momentum estimates for
housing are biased upward because of the implicit averaging of the dependent
variable for housing returns.
We then interact the estimates of the momentum and reversion parameters
with REIT size, dollar trading volume, leverage, inside ownership and prop-
erty focus. We find that momentum is stronger for larger, more focused and
more levered REITs. Reversion is faster for more levered and more focused
REITs. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that predictability of
REIT prices during this period arose from the production of costly information
by traders studying both fundamentals (information traders) and price history
(price traders). Prices are more predictable when REITs are larger, more levered
and more transparent.
We view our result as preliminary because much data collection and research
will be needed before we can fully understand how the structure of the in-
vestment industry and its diverse participants interact to create the observed
predictability in equilibrium. In particular, the results in this research are
from a sample of REITs over an 8-year time span. Nevertheless, these re-
sults do provide important evidence on equilibrium predictability in financial
markets.
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